THE IMPACT O F THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI LABOR MARKET
DAVID CARD* Using data from the Current Population Survey, this paper describes the effect of the Marie1 Boatlift of 1980 on the Miami labor market. The Marie1 immigrants increased the Miami labor force by 7 % , and the percentage increase in labor supply to less-skilled occupations and industries was even greater because most of the immigrants were relatively unskilled. Nevertheless, the Marie1 influx appears to have had virtually no effect on the wages or unemployment rates of less-skilled workers, even among Cubans who had immigrated earlier. The author suggests that the ability of Miami's labor market to rapidly absorb the Marie1 immigrants was largely owing to its adjustment to other large waves of immigrants in the two decades before the Marie1 Boatlift. 0 NE of the chief concerns of immigranatives. Second, the locational choices of tion policy-makers is the extent to immigrants and natives presumably dewhich immigrants depress the labor marpend on expected labor market opportuket opportunities of less-skilled natives.
nities. Immigrants tend to move to cities Despite the presumption that an influx of where the growth in demand for labor can immigrants will substantially reduce native accommodate their supply. Even if new wages, existing empirical studies suggest immigrants cluster in only a few cities (as that the effect is small. (See the survey by they do in the United States), inter-city Greenwood and McDowell [I9861 and migration of natives will tend to offset the studies by Grossman [1982] , Borjas [1987] , adverse effects of immigration. and Lalonde and Tope1 [1987] .) There are These considerations illustrate the diffitwo leading explanations for this finding.
culty of using the correlation across cities First, immigrants have, on average, only between wages and immigrant densities to slightly lower skills than the native popumeasure the effect of immigration on the " lation. Thus, econometric studies based on labor market opportunities of natives. They the distribution of the existing stock of also underscore the value of a natural eximmigrants probably understate the effect periment that corresponds more closely to of unskilled immigration on less-skilled an exogenous increase in the supply of immigrants to a particular labor market. The experiences of the Miami labor declaration on April 20, 1980 , that Cubans wishing to emigrate to the United States were free to leave from the port of Mariel.' Fifty percent of the Marie1 immigrants settled permanently in Miami. The result was a 7% increase in the labor force of Miami and a 20% increase in the number of Cuban workers in Miami. This paper summarizes the effects of the Boatlift on the Miami labor market, focusing on wages and unemployn~ent rates of less-skilled workers. The analysis is based on individual micro-data for 1979-85 from the merged outgoing rotation group samples of the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Three features of the Marie1 incident and the .Census data greatly facilitate the analysis. First, the CPS sample of the Miami metropolitan area is relatively large: roughly 1,200 individuals per month. Second, a comprehensive picture of the Miami labor market in the months just before the Marie1 Boatlift is available from the 1980 Census, which was conducted on April 1, 1980. Finally, unlike most other ethnic groups, Cubans are separately identified in the CPS questionnaire. Thus, it is possible to estimate wage rates, unemployment rates, and other economic indicators for both Cubans and nonCubans in the Miami labor market, and to measure the effects of the Marie1 immigration on the two groups separately.
Overview of the Miami Labor
Market Before the Boatlift For at least a decade prior to the Marie1 Boatlift, Miami was the most immigrantintensive city in the country. Tabulations from the 1980 Census indicate that 35.5% of residents in the Miami Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) were foreign-born,2 compared to 22.3% in Los 'See Masud-Piloto (1988, chaps. 6-7) for an overview of the political developments that led to the Mariel Boatlift.
See U.S. Department of Commerce (1983) . The Miami SMSA consists of Dade County, and includes Miami City as well as a number of smaller towns and cities. Throughout this paper, I use "hIia~ni" to refer to this broader geographic region.
Angeles, the city with the next-highest immigrant fraction, and 6.1 % nationwide. At the time of the Census, 56% of immigrants in Miami were of Cuban origin. The remaining foreign-born residents, who accounted for 16% of the Miami population, included other Hispanic groups and a broad selection of Caribbean and European nationals.
Miami also has a significant black population. The fraction of black residents was 15.0% in 1970 and had increased to 17.3% by the time of the 1980 Census. The large concentrations of both immigrants and blacks makes Miami ideal for studying the effect of increased immigration on the labor market opportunities of black natives. Table 1 , an inflow of immigrants resulting in a one percentage point increase in the fraction of Cubans in Miami xvould lead to a weighted average increase of .95% in the si~pply of labor to occupations held by whites. Under the same conditions the increase would be .99% for blacks, 1.025% for non-Cuban Hispanics, and 1.065%for Cubans themselves. These calculations suggest that the overlap bet,ween the occupational djstributioris of t!le four groups is relatively high.
5 -rhi4 irlclex is derived in Altonji and Card (1989: 15-16 From the first days of the Boatlift, the characteristics of the Marie1 immigrants (hereafter referred to as Mariels) have been a subject of controversy. Among those who were permitted to leave Cuba were several hundred inmates of mental hospitals and jails. Many of these individuals were arrested by immigration officials upon their arrival in the United States, and over 1,000 were sent to a special prison facility in Atlanta to await deportation back to Cuba.5 A similar number were arrested for crimes committed in the United States, and they still await determination of their ultimate immigration stat~.Contemporary reports indicate that the Mariels included a relatively high fraction of less-skilled workers and a high fraction of individuals with low English ability (Business Week 1980) .
Although the regular Current Population Survey questionnaire does not distinguish Mariels from other foreign and These tabulations are presented in greater detail in an earlier ~ersion of this paper (Card 1989, Table   ' )" See Masud-Pihto (1988:100-103) Under a 1984 agreement a total of 2,700 Marie1 immigrants were to be returned to Cuba.
Mariel immigrants were blamed for, and indeed seem to h a~e committed, many crimes in the first few months after the Boatlift. U'ilbanks (1984) reported that 38 of the 574 homicides in Miami in 1980 were committed by Mariel immigrants. Disaffected Mariels were involved in 6 airline highjacking attempts in August 1980 . See Masud-Piloto (1988 The unadjusted wage gap between Mariels and other Cubans is 34%. Part of this differential is clearly attributable to the lower education levels and younger ages of the Mariels. A simple linear regression for the logarithm of average hourly earnings fitted to the sample of Cubans with earnings in 1984 suggests that the Mariels earned 18% lower wages than other Cubans, controlling for education, potential experience, and gender (the standard error of this estimate is .08). This gap presumably reflects the combination of lower language ability and a shorter assimilation time in the United States among the Mariels, as well as any differences in abilitv or motivation be- increased nearly 30% between 1979 30% between and 1980 30% between (see Wilbanks 1984 . On the weekend of May 17, 1980, a three-day riot occurred in several black neighborhoods, killing 13. A government-sponsored committee that was set up to investigate the riot identified other long-standing grievances in the black community as its cause, but cited the labor market competition of Cuban refugees as an important background factor (Governor of Florida 1980: 14-13).
Another widely cited indicator of the labor market pressure created by the Marie1 influx is the Miami unemployment rate, which rose from 5.0% in April 1980 to 7.1% in July. Over the same period state and national unemployment rates followed a similar pattern, suggesting that the changes in Miami were not solely a response to the Marie1 influx. Nevertheless, widespread joblessness of refugees throughout the summer of 1980 contributed to a perception that labor market opportunities for less-skilled natives were threatened by the Marie1 immig r a n t~.~ Tables 3 and 4 present simple averages of wage rates and unemploynlent rates for whites, blacks, Cubans, and other Hispanics in the Miami labor market between 1979 and 1985. For comparative purposes, I have assembled similar data for whites, blacks, and Hispanics in four other cities: Atlanta, Los Angeles, Houston, and Tampa-St. Petersburg. These four cities were selected both because they had relatively large populations of blacks and Hispanics and because they exhibited a pattern of economic growth similar to that in Miami over the late 1970s and early 1980s. A comparison of employment growth rates (based on establishment-level data) suggests that economic conditions were very similar in Miami and the average of the four comparison cities between 1976 and 1984.
The wage data in Table 3 reveal several features of the Miami labor market. Perhaps most obvious is that earnings are lower in Miami than in the comparison cities. The differentials in 1979 ranged from 8% for whites to 15% for blacks. More surprising is that real earnings levels of whites in both Miami and the comparison cities were fairly constant between 1979 and 1983. This pattern contrasts with the general decline in real wages in the U.S. economy over this period (see Round and Johnson 1989:5-6 ) and underscores the relatively close correspondence between economic conditions in Miami and the comparison cities. Table 6 , helow.)
Wage rates for non-Cuban Hispanics in Miami were fairly stable between 1979 and 1085, with only a slight dip in 1983. In contrast, Hispanic wage rates in the coniparisori cities fell about 6 percentage points over this period. Again, there is 120 evidence of a negative effect in Miami, either in the immediate post -l\/lariel period or over the longer run. Table 3 does indicate a decline in Cuban wage rates relarive to the wage rates of other groups in Miami. Relative t o the wages of whites, for example, Cuban wages fell b y 6-7 percentage points bet.wTeen 1979 and 1981. Assu~nirig that the wages of earlier Cubarl immigr;ints were constant, this dec.line is consistent with the addicion of 45,000 Mariel workers to the pool of Cubans in the Miami labor force, and with the 34% wage differential between Mariels arid ot,he~. (;uha~as noted i r~ l'able 3. A more thorough ana!ysis of Cuban wages is presented in Table 7, below.
Thc unemployment rates in T;~bie3 lead to he same general conclusions ' 1s the wage data in Table 3 . There is no e~.icir.nce that the hlaricl influx adversely affecterl the unemployment rate of either :v'rlites or blacks. T h e unemployment rates ~1 1~5 a I C S~ severe cyclical downturn in the black lahor rnarket in Miami in 1982-83. Black urlemployir!ent rates in Miami, which had been gration reduced the earnings of lesspattern, although the sampling errors are skilled natives in Miami. A more direct large enough to prevent precise inferanswer is provided by the data in Table 5 . ences.
In order to identify "less-skilled" workers, Unlike the situation for whites and I fit a linear regression equation for the blacks, there was a sizable increase in logarithm of hourly earnings to workers in Cuban unernployinent rates in Miami the comparison cities. The explanatory following the Mariel immigration. Cuban variables in this regression included eduunemployment rates were roughly 3 percation, potential experience, squared pocentage points higher during 1980-81 tential experience, indicator variables for than would have been expected on the each gender and race group, and interacbasis of earlier (and later) patterns. Assumtions of the gender-race indicators with ing that the unemployment rates of earlier potential experience and squared potenCuban immigrants were unaffected by the tial ex~erience. 1 then used the estimated I Marie1 influx, this effect is consistent with coefficients from this equation to form a unemployment rates of around 20% predicted wage for each non-Cuban worker among the Mariels themselves. Although in Miami. and sorted the s a m~l e from I far from conclusive, this simple calculation each year into quartiles on the basis of suggests that the increase in Cuban unempredicted wage rates. ployment rates could easily be explained This procedure provides a simple way as a result of the addition of the Marie1 to identify more-and less-skilled workers refugees to the C,uban population, with in the Miami labor market. Means of little or no effect on earlier immigrants. actual log wages for each quartile and year The simple averages of wages and are presented in the first four columns of AJote: Predicted wage is based on a linear prediction equation for the log wage fitted to individuals in fo~u. comparison cities; see text. The sample consists of non-Cubans (male and female, white, black, and Hispanic) between the ages of 16 and 61 with valid wage data in the earnings supplement of the C~u r e n t Population Survey. Wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index (1980= 100). Table 5 . T h e difference in mean wages between the first and fourth quartiles, which provides an index of the spread in the wage distribution, is presented in the fifth column of the table.
If the Marie1 immigration reduced the wages of less-skilled natives, one would expect to observe a decline in the wage of workers in the lowest skill quartile, at least relative to workers in the upper quartile. T h e actual averages show no evidence of this effect. Apart from the temporary increase in relative wages of workers in the lowest quartile between 1979 and 1981, the distribution of non-Cubans' wages in the Miami labor market was remarkably stable between 1979 and 1985. Taken together with the data in Table 3 , these data provide little evidence of a negative effect of the Marie1 influx on the earnings of natives.
A final check is provided in Table 6 , which contains more detailed information on wages, employment rates, and unemployment rates for blacks in Miami between 1979 and 1985. I separately analyzed the set of all blacks and the set of blacks with less than 12 years of education in order to isolate any stronger effect on the less-skilled segment of the black U population. For both groups I calculated the differential in wages between Miami and the c o m~a r i s o n cities (both the unadjusted difference in mean log ways and a regression-adjusted differential that controls for education, gender, marital status, part-time status, privatelpublic employment, and potential experience) and the differentials in the employment-population rate and the unem~lovment rate
,
between Miami and the comparison cities. As indicated in Table 3 , the wage differential for blacks in Miami relative to those in the comparison cities decreased slightly between 1979 and 1981. T h e differential increased substantiallv in 1982. but then began a steady d o w n d r d trend after 1983. By 1985, the wage gap was less than 3% for all black workers. and was actually positive for less-educatkd blacks. T h e magnitudes of the regressionadjusted wage differentials are not significantly different from the unadjusted wage differentials, and show no evidence of any effect of the Marie1 immigration on black wages.
A similar conclusion emerges from the pattern of differentials in employment- Rate" refers to the unemployment rate among those in the labor force.
population ratios and unemployment rates.Y Among all blacks, there is some evidence of a relative decline in the employmentto-population ratio in Miami between 1979 and 1983 .1° This effect seems to have started in 1982, and is less pronounced among low-education blacks than among those with more education. As noted in Tag I also computed regression-adjusted employmentpopulation and une~nployment gaps using simple linear probability ~nodels. The explanatory power of the statistical rnodels is so low, however, that the adjusted differentials are allnost identical to the unadjusted differentials.
''Although they are not reported in Table 6 , I have also constructed differentials in the labor force participation rate between hliami and the comparison cities. For blacks as a whole these show a decline in relative participation rates in Xlianii starting in 1982, a l t h o~~g h the decline is only temporary for the low-education group. The differential in labor force participation rates is approxi~nately equal to the differential in the e~nployment-pop~~latioll rate plus the differential in the iunemplo~lnent rate multiplied by the average labor for.ce participation rate (.'ifor the overall group, .55 for the low-education group). ble 4, the series of unemployment rate differentials indicates a sharp downturn in labor market opportunities for blacks in 1982. Given the lag between the arrival of the Mariels and the emergence of this unemployment gap, however, the gap seems more likely to have resulted from the 1982 recession than from the influx of lessskilled immigrants.
T h e effects of the Marie1 immigration on Cuban labor market outcomes are examined in detail in Table 7 . T h e first column of the table reproduces the means of log wages in each year from the third row of Table 3 . T h e second column gives predicted log wages of Cubans in Miami, using estimated coefficients from a regression equation fit to Hispanics in the four comparison cities. T h e gap between actual and predicted wages is presented in the third column of the table. These series show that the 9 percentage point decline in Cuban real wage rates in Miami between 1979 and 1985 was a result of two complementary factors: a 670 relative 1984 and 1985, and in light of the decline in the "quality" of the Cuban labor sampling errors it is difficult to draw force in Miami, as measured by the decline precise inferences. T h e difference bein their predicted wages, and a 3 percenttween the means of the first and fourth age point increase in the quality-adjusted quartiles is 9 percentage points higher in wage gap between Cuban workers in 1984 than 1979, but the gap narrows to Miami and Hispanic workers in the comonly 2 points in 1985. These figures are parison cities. Two-thirds of the wage consistent with a larger decline in earnings decline is therefore attributed to the at the low end of the Cuban wage changing productivity characteristics of distribution after the Marie1 immigration, the Cuban labor force, and one-third to a as might be expected from the addition of decrease in the return to skills for Cubans a large group of relatively unskilled in the Miami labor market.
workers to the ~o o l of Cubans. T h e extent
1
T h e next four columns of Table 7 give of the decline, however, is not precisely the means of log wages for Cuban workers measured. in each auartile of the distribution of An alternative method to assess the predicted wages (using the same prediceffect of the Marie1 immigration on the tion equation as was used to form the earnings of Cubans in the Miami labor means in column 2). These means suggest market is to compare Cuban wages in that real wage rates of Cubans in the Miami to the wages of Cubans elsewhere lowest quartile of the wage distribution in the United States. Since the fraction of declined by 11-12 percentage points beMariels in the Cuban labor force is tween 1979 and 1985. T h e decline is roughly the same inside and outside smaller for workers in the higher quarMiami, this comparison controls for any tiles, but there is some variation between unobservable differences in skill between the Mariels and other Cubans (due to language ability, for example).ll T h e ninth arid t.enth columnls of ' Table 7 contain estiiuates of the wage differential for Cubans in Nianli reiat.ive to those elsewhere in the coilntry, both unadjusted and adjusted for educatiori, gender, part-time status, private sectoripublic sector emplnyment, marital status (interacted with gender], and potential experience. 'i'he earnings differentials conlputed in this way ai-e roughly constant between 1079 ar-td 1984. T h e 1982 unadjusted wage differential is 10 percentage points larger than earlier or later ones, but the regressic-jn-adjusted differential is not significantly differe~rt from any of t.he other differentials. T h e 1983 data also indicate a slightly higher Cuban wage rate outside Miarni. In any case, 3 compariso~l of Cuban wages inside and outside the Miami labor market shouis no evidence of' a widening gap in the years imnlediately follotuing the Mariel immigration. On the assumption that the Marie1 influx had no effect on the wage rntes of other Cubans O U~C Z~P Mianli, this fitading suggesis that. the observed don~ntnrn in Cuban Fvages in Miami can be attributed solely to the "dilution" of the C:tiban iabor force with less-skilled Mariel workers.
Interpretation of the Findings
T h e data in Table 3 --7 point to two conc,i~isi~ns. First, the hrariel inlmiglation iiad essc:ntialiy no effect on the wages or employment outcomes of non-Cuban ivorkers in t hMiarni labor market. Second, and perhaps even more surprising, the Mariel irrrmigr;~tion had 110 strong effect on the wages of' other Cubans. T h e observed decline in average Cuban wage rates iu 3liami after 1980 is no larger than rvorild be expected by simply adding the hlariei in~~riigrallts to the pool of Cuban workers, assunling that the Mariels earned Miami SMSA after June 1980 occurred because of a change in the net migration rate of natives and older cohorts of immigrants, rather than because of a change in the inflow rate of new immigrants. This finding is consistent with the pattern of domestic migration between 1970 and 1980 identified by Filer (1988) , who found a strong negative correlation across SMSAs between the net inmigration rate of natives and the inmigration rate of immigrants.
A second explanation for the rapid absorption of the Marie1 immigrants is the growth of industries that utilize relatively unskilled labor. Altonji and Card's (1989) tabulations from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses indicate that a small set of industries employ a large fraction of immigrants, and that these industries expanded more rapidly bet~veen 1970 and 1980 in cities with large immigrant populations than in other cities. T h e immigrant-U intensive industries identified in their analysis are apparel and textiles, agriculture, furniture, private household services, hotels and motels, eating and drinking establishments, and business services. These are relatively low-wage industries that employ large numbers of semi-skilled operatives and laborers.
A comparison of the industry distributions of employment in Miami and the entire count1 y before and aftei the Mariel Boatlift shows little change in the relative importance of immigrant-intensive industries in Miami.]? Nevertheless, these tabulations suggest that the industry distribution in Miami in the late 1970s was well suited to handle an influx of unskilled immigrants. Textile and apparel industries were particularly prominent in Miami, with 5.5% of total employment in these industries as compared to only 2.35% nationwide. Sebenty-five percent of workers in textiles and apparel and 45% of workers in other manufacturing industries '"hese tabulations are repol.ted in Card (1989 ,  Table 9 ). Pre-Boatlift data are based on the 1979 and 1980 March Current Population Surveys. PostBoatlift data are basec! on the hIarch 1984 and March 1985 CPS. were Cubans. Although employment in immigrant-intensive industries did not expand after the Boatlift, and the Cuban share of employment in these industries was relatively stable, the Mariels may have simply replaced earlier cohorts of Cuban immigrants as the latter moved to more desirable jobs.
Conclusions
T h e experiences of the Miami labor market in the aftermath of the Marie1 Boatlift provide a natural experiment with which to evaluate the effect of unskilled immigration on the labor market opportunities of native workers. T h e Mariel immigrants increased the labor force of the Miami metropolitan area by 7%.
Because most of these immigrants were relatively unskilled, the proportional increase in labor supply to less-skilled occupations and industries was much greater.
Yet, this study shows that the influx of Mariel immigrants had virtually no effect on the wage rates of less-skilled nonCuban workers. Similarly, there is no evidence of an increase in unemployment among less-skilled blacks or ocher nonCuban workers. Rather, the data analysis suggests a remarkably rapid absorptioil of the Mariel immigrants into the Miami labor force, with negligible effects on other groups. Even among the Cuban population there is no iildicatioll that wages or uilemployrnent rates of earlie1 immigrants were substailtially affected by the arrival of the Mariels.
Despite the clear-cut nature of these findings, some cautioil is required in their intermetation. since the Miami labor market is' far from typical of other local labor markets in the United States. Although the arrival of some 60,000 refugees in only a six-month period occasioned probleixis for the Mariel immigrants, in many respects Miami was better prepared to receive them than any other city. In the two decades before the Mariel Boatlift Miami had absorbed a continuing. flow of u Cubans, and in the years since the Boatlift it has continued to receive large numbers T H E MARIEL BOATLIFT of Nicaraguans and other Central Americans. Thus, the Marie1 immigration can be seen as part of a long-run pattern that distinguishes Miami from most other American cities.
Two factors that may have been especially important in facilitating the absorption of the Marie1 immigrants are related to the distinctive character of the Miami labor market. First, Miami's industry structure was well suited to make use of an influx of unskilled labor. This structure, and particularly the high concentration of textile and apparel industries, evolved over the previous two decades in response to earlier waves of immigrants, and may have allowed the Marie1 immigrants to take u p unskilled jobs as earlier Cuban immigrants moved to better ones. Second, because of the high concentration of Hispanics in Miami, the lack of Englishspeaking ability among the Mariels may have had smaller effects than could be expected for other immigrants in other cities.
A final factor in the Marie1 immigration is the response of domestic migration. A comparison of Miami growth rates to those in the rest of Florida suggests that the net migration rate of natives and earlier immigrants into the Miami area slowed considerably after the Boatlift. T o some extent the Mariels may have displaced other migrants from within the United States who could have been expected to move to Miami.
